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Abstract
A competition which is based on the results of (partial) pairwise comparisons
can be modelled by means of a directed graph. Given initial weights on the nodes
in such digraph competitions, we view the measurement of the importance (i.e.,
the cardinal ranking) of the nodes as an allocation problem where we redistribute
the initial weights on the basis of insights from cooperative game theory. After de-
scribing the resulting procedure of redistributing the initial weights, we describe an
iterative process is described which repeats this procedure: at each step the allo-
cation obtained in the previous step determines the new input weights. Existence
and uniqueness of the limit is established for arbitrary digraphs. Applications to
the evaluation of e.g. sport competitions and paired comparison experiments are
discussed.
Keywords: cooperative games, digraph competitions, limit measure, rela-
tional power measure, Shapley value, stochastic processes.
¤CentER and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands. Corresponding author. e-mail address: p.e.m.borm@kub.nl.
yCentER and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands. This author is …nancially supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scienti…c
Research (NWO), ESR-grant 510-01-0504.
zDepartment of Business Economics and Marketing, Eindhoven University of Technology, PO Box
513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
2
1 Introduction
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N;D) where N is a …nite set of nodes and
D ½ N £ N is a binary relation on N representing the set of (directed) arcs. Such
a digraph can represent various hierarchical structures which are based on (partial)
pairwise comparisons. To focus ideas we will mainly consider the example of a sports
competition in which there are teams that play matches against each other. In this
case the nodes represent the teams that participate in the competition, while (i; j) 2 D
means that team i has won the match it played against team j. The model and its
implications however seem applicable in a wide variety of instances. A digraph can also
represent the results of paired comparison experiments (cf. David (1963)) for example
within a group of alternative medicines for a speci…c (aspect of a) disease. Moreover,
within the context of social choice theory, a digraph could summarize the aggregated
pairwise preferences of a group of individuals (based for example on majority voting)
over a certain set of alternatives. Again in a totally di¤erent setting a digraph could
represent the hierarchical structure of certain economic organizations.
A digraph competition can be evaluated using a relational power measure being a func-
tion that assigns to each node a value representing its importance or ‘relational power’
in the competition. Such approaches are numerous in the literature and can be found in,
e.g., Rubinstein (1980) who uses the (Copeland) score measure in ranking the nodes in
tournaments (being complete, asymmetric digraphs), or La¤ond, Laslier and LeBreton
(1993) who use non-cooperative games in …nding the ‘winners’ of a tournament.
The perspective of the present paper is to look at an arbitrary digraph competition
(so not necessarily just tournaments) as a special type of allocation problem where we
assume initially that each node is assigned equal weight (say equal to one). Measuring
relational power then can be seen as ‘fairly’ redistributing these weights taking account
the hierarchical structure that is represented by the digraph. An adequate analysis
of such an allocation problem should not only be based on arguments of individual
performance but also on arguments of more relative group performance. Hence we
turn to associated cooperative games in coalitional form since this theory aims for fair
redistributions based on coalitional considerations. Because of this explicit link to game
theory, the nodes in a digraph from now on will be called players. This approach was
followed by van den Brink and Borm (1994) who allocated the initial weights of the
players in a digraph competition according to the Shapley value of the conservative
score game corresponding to the digraph competition. The resulting relational power
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measure was shown to coincide with the BG-measure as de…ned in van den Brink and
Gilles (1994).
As mentioned by van den Brink and Borm (1994) most of their results carry through for
general weights, i.e., the initial weights need not be equal to one. Instead of taking initial
weights equal to one, it seems natural to take weights that already, somehow, re‡ect the
relational power of the players in a digraph competition. For example, one could take the
Shapley value of the conservative score game as weights. We exploit this by investigating
the limit behavior in the iterative process which repeats the procedure described above
by considering the weights as prescribed by the Shapley value at each step as new input
weights. Using standard techniques from the theory of stochastic processes, it is shown
that this limit is uniquely determined. In particular the limit measure also is a stationary
measure: a measure having the property that taking it as input weights yields the same
weights as ‘outputs’. In general however there can be more than one stationary power
measure. Other stationary point or ”limit of procedures” approaches can be found for
example in Daniels (1969) and Keener (1993).
The same procedure as discussed above can be applied to weighted digraph competitions
in which weights are assigned to the arcs to re‡ect in some sense the importance of the
arcs. For many applications this seems useful. As an example we mention ranking the
teams in a sports competition in which all teams play against each other twice (home
and away), or a sports competition in which not all teams play against the other teams
the same number of times. Then the weight assigned to an arc (i; j) can be the number
of times team i defeated team j. This application could be used when making a ranking
list in order to determine the ‘best’ team in a number of competitions where the set of
teams in every competition may di¤er. This is especially useful when making a ranking
list based on matches played during a number of years. Another example can be found
in paired comparison experiments, e.g., with respect to medicines. Letting the players
correspond to the medicines, the weight associated to the arc (i; j) could correspond
to the relative performance or e¤ectivity rate of medicine i compared to medicine j.
Within social choice theory, the set of players being a set of alternatives from which a
speci…c group of agents has to choose, the weight assigned to the arc (i; j) could equal
the number of agents that prefer alternative i to alternative j.
We would like to emphasize that this paper is just meant to o¤er a new limit of measure
procedure for digraph competitions based on cooperative game theoretical tools, and
to discuss possible applications. A comparison of this new cardinal ranking procedure
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with other scoring or ranking methods on the basis of desirable properties within the
general framework of social choice correspondences can be found in Borm, van den Brink,
Levinsky and Slikker (2000).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the conservative score game
and its Shapley value as a way to evaluate digraph competitions. Section 3 introduces
the iterative procedure described above. It de…nes the limit measure and shows its
uniqueness. In Section 4 we show that similar results also hold for weighted digraph
competitions in which weights are assigned to the arcs, and apply the procedure to
an example from the English soccer competition. Finally, in Section 5 we show that
the limit measure remains the same if we ‘disturb’ the underlying Shapley value in an
‘egalitarian’ way.
2 Preliminaries: the Shapley value of a conservative
score game
In this section we present the game and the (one step) measure by which we will evaluate
digraph competitions (N;D). We assume the binary relation D to be irre‡exive, i.e.,
(i; i) 62 D for all i 2 N . The collection of all irre‡exive digraphs1 on N is denoted by
DN .
Let D 2 DN . For i 2 N the nodes in SD(i) := fj 2 N j (i; j) 2 Dg are called
the successors of i in D, and the nodes in PD(i) := fj 2 N j (j; i) 2 Dg are called
the predecessors of i in D. A relational power measure is a function f : DN ! RN
that assigns an jN j-dimensional real vector to every digraph on N . In this paper we
consider the relational power measure that is derived from the Shapley value of a related
cooperative game.
Van den Brink and Borm (1994) introduce to each digraph D 2 DN the conservative
score game (N; vcD) with v
c
D : 2
N ! R given by vcD(E) = jfj 2 N j (PD(j)[ fjg) ½ Egj





where uPD(i)[fig is the unanimity game
2 on PD(i)[fig. The game (N; vcD), or shortly vcD;
1In the sequel we refer to irre‡exive digraphs simply as digraphs.
2The unanimity game uT ; T ½ N , assigns the value 1 to all coalitions E ¾ T , and the value 0 to all
other coalitions.
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assigns to every coalition E ½ N the number of players in E that have no predecessors
outside E. Thus, …rst we implicitly assign to every player an initial weight equal to one.
Secondly, our interpretation is that all predecessors of a player (and the player himself)
have a rightful direct claim on the weight of that speci…c player. Consequently, the value
of a coalition of players in a conservative score game vcD can be seen as the maximal
total weight for which there is no rightful direct claim from outside this coalition.
In particular, varying D, and applying a game theoretic solution concept to the game
vcD yields a speci…c relational power measure. We will redistribute the initial weights in
a digraph competition D by applying the Shapley value to the conservative score game
vcD. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) of a game (N; v) with v : 2







(v(P (i; ¼) [ fig)¡ v(P (i; ¼))), for all i 2 N;
where ¦(N) denotes the collection of all permutations ¼ : N ! N on N and P (i; ¼) =
fj 2 N j ¼(j) < ¼(i)g for every ¼ 2 ¦(N) and i 2 N . Applying the Shapley value to
conservative score games yields the BG-measure ¯ : DN ! RN (cf. van den Brink and








for all i 2 N: (1)
Thus, ¯ distributes the initial weight of each node in a digraph equally over itself and
all its predecessors3.
Let us provide a brief motivation for choosing the Shapley value. Next to its rather
appealing probabilistic interpretation in terms of the expected marginal contribution
of a player when sequentially constructing the grand coalition N , the Shapley value of
a conservative score game constitutes the barycentre of the core because of convexity
of the game (cf. Shapley (1971)). Hence, the Shapley value can be seen as a nice
compromise between all possible coalitionally stable allocations.
Example 2.1. Consider the digraph D = f(1; 2); (1; 3); (2; 3); (2; 4); (3; 4); (4; 1)g on
N = f1; 2; 3; 4g. To have an interpretation, let N be a set of medicines and let D
summarize the results of a (complete) paired comparison experiment.
According to the ranking by the (Copeland) score-measure medicines 1 and 2 then
are ranked equally and are ranked higher than medicines 3 and 4 (which are both
3We remark that this is not the ‘original’ BG-measure considered in van den Brink and Gilles (1994),
but the modi…ed version considered in van den Brink and Borm (1994).
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ranked equal). However, ¯ provides a complete ranking with medicine 1 as the best one:
¯(D) = 1
6
(8; 7; 4; 5). For example, ¯4(D) =
5
6
consist of two parts: 1
2
(of the weight of
player 1) and 1
3
(of the weight of 4).
3 An iterative procedure
In the measure ¯ discussed in the previous section it is implicitly assumed that e-
very node in a digraph competition has an initial weight equal to one, and measuring
relational power is seen as fairly redistributing these weights based on the structure
represented by the digraph. Instead of taking initial weights equal to one, it seems
natural to take weights that already re‡ect the relational power of the players. If the
measure ¯1 := ¯ determines the weights in the redistibution method discussed in the
previous section, then one obtains the second ordermeasure ¯2. Of course, this second
order measure can be used as new input weights, and so on, yielding higher order
measures. We will show that the iterative process which repeats the procedure described
above, by considering the (t ¡ 1)th-order measure ¯t¡1 as new input weights at the tth
step, has a unique limit.
This limit measure is a speci…c stationary power measure in the sense that when taking
the weights equal to this measure yields these same weights as ‘output’ measure. In
general however there can be more than one stationary power measure.
Formally, it is done as follows. We start with the game v1D being the conservative score
game and consider its Shapley value ¯(D) = ¯1(D). For t 2 f2; 3; : : : g we recursively




D )uPD(i)[fig. It is easy to verify that for the Shapley
value Sh(vtD) = ¯








for all i 2 N and t 2 f2; 3; : : : g:
Example 3.1. For the digraph competition D of Example 2.1 it holds that ¯2(D) =
1
36
(53; 39; 18; 34); yielding the same ranking as ¯1:
In order to prove the existence of the limit measure we turn to the theory of stochastic
processes, and present an alternative way to look at a digraph competition. For every
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D 2 DN we de…ne the transition matrix P(D) as the matrix which components are given
by pij = 1jPD(j)j+1 if (i; j) 2 D or i = j, and pij = 0 otherwise. The system (N;P(D))
can be seen as a stochastic process in which N is a set of states an item possibly can be
in at time periods t = 0; 1; 2; : : : , and pij is the probability that the item is in state i at
time t > 0 given that it was in state j at time t ¡ 1. (Note that P(D) is a stochastic
matrix (nonnegative and the columns add up to one), with a positive diagonal.) Now,
suppose that at t = 0 there is exactly one item in every state in N . Then, the measure
¯t(D) which by de…nition eqals (P(T ))t1; yields4 the expected number of items in the
states at time t ¸ 1. The limit measure yields the expected number of items in each
state after repeating this procedure in…nitely many times. The existence of this limit
measure follows from standard results on stochastic matrices as documented in, e.g.,
Berger (1993), which for the sake of completeness are be presented below.
For the stochastic process (N;P(D)) and i; j 2 N we denote by ½ij the probability to
ever arrive at i starting from j. Then i 2 N is called recurrent if ½ii = 1, and it is called
transient if ½ii < 1, i.e., state i is recurrent if with probability one an item starting in
state i ever returns to state i, and it is transient if there is a positive probability that
the item will not return to state i. By NR we denote the set of all recurrent states, and
by NT we denote the set of all transient states in (N;P(D)). A set T ½ N is a closed
set in P(D) if ½ij = 0 for all i 2 T; j 62 T . A set T ½ N is a closed irreducibleset in
P(D) if it is closed and ½ij > 0 for all i; j 2 T .
Closed irreducible sets in the stochastic process (N;P(D)) correspond to top cycles in
D. The subset T ½ N is a top cycle in D 2 DN if (i) for every i; j 2 T it holds that
(i; j) 2 tr(D) where tr(D) denotes the transitive closure5 of D, and (ii) for every i 2 T
and h 2 N n T it holds that (h; i) 62 D. The set NR of recurrent states then coincides
with the set of nodes that belong to a top cycle, and the set NT of transient states
consists of the nodes that do not belong to any top cycle.
Proposition 3.2. For every stochastic process (N;P(D)) it holds that NR is a …nite
union of closed irreducible sets.
Now, for every closed irreducible set T and j 2 N , let ½T (j) be the probability to ever
arrive at a state in T starting at state j. Then (i) starting in a state in T we never leave
state T , (ii) starting in a recurrent state outside T we never arrive at a state in T , and
4By 1 we denote the vector with all coordinates equal to one.
5The transitive closure tr(D) of D 2 DN is given by (i; j) 2 tr(D) if and only if there exists a
sequence of nodes i1; : : : im such that i1 = i; im = j and (ik¡1; ik) 2 D for all 2  k  m.
8
(iii) starting in a transient state the probability to ever arrive at a state in T is equal to
the probability we arrive at a state in T after one step plus the sum over all transient
states of the probability that we arrive at that transient state after one step multiplied
by the probability that we ever arrive at a state in T starting from this transient state.
Thus,
(i) ½T (j) = 1 if j 2 T ,
(ii) ½T (j) = 0 if j 2 NRnT , and
(iii) ½T (j) = §i2T pij +§i2NT pij ¢ ½T (i) if j 2 NT .
Note that this induces a system of jN j inpependent equations in the jN j unknown
variables ½T (j); j 2 N . This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. For every closed irreducible set T in a stochastic process (N;P(D))
the probabilities ½T (j); j 2 N; are uniquely determined.
So, for each state j and closed irreducible set T the probability for j to ever arrive
at a state in T is uniquely determined. We are left to determine the probabilities
that from state j one ever arrives at a particular state i in T . In order to do that
we de…ne a stationarydistribution ¼T of the closed irreducible set T in the stochastic
process (N;P(D)) as a distribution ¼ : T ! R such that (i) Pi2T ¼(i) = 1, and (ii)
P(D jT )¼ = ¼, where D jT2 DT is given by D jT= f(i; j) 2 D j i; j 2 Tg.
Proposition 3.4 (see Berger (1993) Theorem III, p.105). Every closed irreducible set
T in a stochastic process (N;P(D)) has a unique stationary distribution ¼T .
From the propositions stated above it follows that the iterative procedure described in
this section has a unique limit distribution.
Theorem 3.5 (see Berger (1993) Corollary X, p. 109). Let every closed irreducible set











0 if (i 2 NT ) or (i 2 NR and j 2 NRnTi)
¼Ti(i) if i 2 NR and j 2 Ti
½Ti(j):¼Ti(i) if i 2 NR, j 2 NT ;
where Ti is the closed irreducible set in (N;P(D)) containing i.
This theorem immediately yields the following corollary.
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Corollary 3.6. For everyD 2 DN it holds that limt!1(P(D))t1. exists and is uniquely
determined.
This makes it possible to de…ne the limit measure ¸ : DN ! RN given by ¸(D) =























j2NT ½Ti(j) if i 2 NR











if i 2 NR
0 if i 2 NT :
where Ti is the closed irreducible set containing i 2 NR.
Example 3.7. Consider the digraph competition of Examples 2.1 and 3.1. Note that
N is the only top cycle in this digraph, and thus the limit measure is obtained as the
unique stationary power measure which adds up to 4: ¸(D) = 4
23
(8; 6; 3; 6). So, now
medicines 2 and 4 are ranked equally as second-best.
A relational power measure f : DN ! RN is a stationary power measure if P(D)f(D) =
f(D) for every D 2 DN . The limit measure ¸ is a stationary power measure. Since the
internal stationary distribution within a closed irreducible set only depends on the rela-
tions within that closed irreducible set it follows from Proposition 3.4 that the concept
of a stationary power measure determines the proportional power distribution within
sets. Since all transient states are assigned power value zero by all stationary power
measures there is a unique stationary power measure (up to normalization) if there is
one closed irreducible set. However, if there is more than one closed irreducible set then
the concept of a stationary power measure does not determine the power distribution
between closed irreducible sets. However, the limit measure ¸ does.
Using the limit measure in ranking the players in a digraph competition is a re…nement
of the top cycle procedure which ranks the players in two groups: the players that belong
to a top cycle (or closed irreducible set) and the ones that do not. Not only does ¸ rank
the players within top cycles, it also ranks players across top cycles which also is not
done by the top cycle approach. The limit measure ¸ does not rank the players that
do not belong to a top cycle. In a straightforward way this ranking can be re…ned by
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computing the limit measure ¸(D jNT ) of the digraph restricted to the transient states.
Of course, the procedure can be re…ned further if necessary.
Example 3.8. Consider the digraph competition D on N = f1; 2; 3; 4g given by D =
f(1; 3); (1; 4); (2; 3); (3; 4)g. This digraph competition has two top cycles: f1g and f2g.








. In order to rank the nodes 3
and 4 we can consider ¸(Djf3;4g) = (1; 0). So we rank the nodes in the order (1; 2; 3; 4).
We conclude this section by considering a digraph competition that is determined from
a real sports competition.
Example 3.9. The …rst round of the FIFA Soccer World Championship 1998 consisted
of (eight) groups of four teams such that each team played each other team in its
group exactly once. The scoring rule that was used gave a team three points for a
win, one point for a draw, and zero points for a loss. One group consisted of the
teams from Brazil (B), Norway (N), Morrocco (M) and Scotland (S). If we represent
a draw between two teams by no relation between the two then the results of the
matches are described by the digraph competition D on N = fB;N;M; Sg given by
D = f(B;M); (B; S); (N;B); (M;S)g. The FIFA-scores assigned to the teams are 6 for
Brazil, 5 for Norway, 4 for Morrocco and 1 for Scotland. So, Brazil is ranked highest in
this group with Norway ranked second.
Looking at the digraph D we see that it has one top-cycle which consists only of Norway.
So, our limit measure would rank Norway highest. Applying the limit measure to the
competition restricted to the other three teams we see that Brazil is the only top cycle in
the restricted competition, so Brazil is ranked second. So, comparing these two scoring
rules we see that the FIFA score ranks Brazil highest, while the limit measure ranks
Norway highest.
4 Weighted digraph competitions
In this section we generalize the results discussed before to weighted digraph compe-
titions in which we put weights on the arcs. A weighted digraphon N is a function
! : N £ N ! R+. We assume that !(i; i) > 0 for all i 2 N . The collection of all
weighted digraphs on N is denoted by WN .
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for all i 2 N and ! 2 WN (2)




(i 2 N , j 2 N). Multiplying (P(!))t, t 2 N, with the vector 1 with all
elements equal to one, one obtains the tth-order weighted measure ¯t(!). Since P(!) is
a stochastic matrix with a positive diagonal similar results as stated for (non-weighted)
digraph competitions can be derived. A closed irredecible set in P(!) now coincides
with a set of nodes T ½ N such that (i) !(i; j) = 0 for all i 2 N n T , j 2 T , and (ii)
for every i; j 2 T there exists a sequence of nodes h1; : : : ; hm such that h1 = i; hm = j,
and !(ht; ht+1) > 0 for all t 2 f1; : : : ;m ¡ 1g. Consequently, ¸(!) = limt!1 ¯t(!) is
well-de…ned.
Generalizing the results to weighted digraph competitions broadens the possibilities of
applications of the (generalized) limit measure ¸. As an example we mention ranking the
teams in a sports competitions in which all teams play against each other twice (home
and away), or a sports competitions in which not all teams play against other teams
the same number of times. Then the weight !(i; j) can be the number of times team
i defeated team j. This application can be used when making a ranking list in order
to determine the ‘best’ team in a number of competitions such that the set of teams in
every competition di¤ers (for example by promoting to and from higher, respectively,
lower competitions).
We assumed the weights !(i; i); i 2 N to be positive. The exact value of these weights
depends on the speci…c application one has in mind. In the example of a sports compe-
tition in which each team plays against each other team twice and !(i; j), i 6= j, being
the number of times team i defeated team j, it seems natural to take !(i; i) = 2 for all
i 2 N . This can be seen as i playing two matches against itself (similarly as against all
other teams).
We conclude this section by computing the limit measure ¸ for the digraph competition
that is derived from the Carling Premier League 1997-1998.
Example 4.1. In this example we compare the ranking of the soccer teams that partici-
pated in the Carling Premier League 1997-1998 (the highest division in English soccer in
that year) based on the limit measure to the ranking actually used. The second column
of Table 1 provides the names of the teams in the order they were actually ranked. This
12
Team Wins Draws Losses CPL-score ¸ ¸-ranking
1 Arsenal 23 9 6 78 1.8742 1
2 Manchester United 23 8 7 77 1.6309 2
3 Liverpool 18 11 9 65 1.5217 3
4 Chelsea 20 3 15 63 1.1518 7
5 Leeds United 17 8 13 59 1.0995 8
6 Blackburn Rovers 16 10 12 58 1.1956 6
7 Aston Villa 17 6 15 57 1.2936 4
8 West Ham United 16 8 14 56 1.0161 11
9 Derby County 16 7 15 55 1.2133 5
10 Leicester City 13 14 11 53 1.0787 9
11 Coventry City 12 16 10 52 0.8438 13
12 Southampton 14 6 18 48 1.0391 10
13 Newcastle United 11 11 16 44 0.5937 18
14 Tottenham Hotspur 11 11 16 44 0.5956 17
15 Wimbledon 10 14 14 44 0.6528 15
16 She¢eld Wednesday 12 8 18 44 0.9645 12
17 Everton 9 13 16 40 0.6589 14
18 Bolton Wanderers 9 13 16 40 0.5676 19
19 Barnsley 10 5 23 35 0.6144 16
20 Crystal Palace 8 9 21 33 0.4212 20
Table 1. Scores and rankings Carling Premier League 1997-1998.
ranking is based on the CPL-score that is given the sixth column. This score is obtained
by giving each team three points for a win, one point for a draw and zero points for a
loss (so, it is the same scoring rule as used by the FIFA in Example 3.9). The number
of matches won, draws and matches lost are given in columns 3, 4 and 5, respectivly.
The score according to the limit measure ¸ is given in the eighth column, with cor-
responding ranking in the ninth column. In order to determine ¸ we need the actual
digraph competition, i.e., we need to know for every match which team won or whether
there was a draw. These data with the corresponding transition matrix are given in the
appendix.
Without giving a full comparison of the two rankings we just point to some striking
di¤erences. At the top nothing changes with respect to the three highest ranked teams
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(Arsenal, Manchester United and Liverpool). However, at the bottom we see that
Barnsley is ranked nineteen according to the CPL-score, while according to ¸ it is
ranked sixteen. This has the following important consequence. The three lowest ranked
teams at the end of the competition are relegated and have to leave the Premier League.
So, Barnsley is actually relegated by the CPL-score, but would not have been relegated
if ¸ had been used. Instead, Newcastle United (ranked thirteen according to CPL-score)
should have been relegated according to ¸ with rank eighteen.
5 Compound measures
In Section 3 we applied an iterative procedure to the measure ¯ and showed the existence
and uniqueness of the limit distribution ¸. This limit remains the same if we ‘disturb’
¯ in an ‘egalitarian’ way. Formally this can be done by taking convex combinations of
¯ and the egalitarian measure° : DN ! RN which assigns to every node in a digraph
competitionD 2 DN a value equal to one, i.e., °i(D) = 1: Convex combinations ¯®(D) =
®¯(D) + (1¡ ®)°(D) for ® 2 [0; 1] and digraph6 D 2 DN are refered to as compound
measures:
We now apply our iterative procedure with respect to the compound measure ¯® and
initial distribution 1, i.e., each node having equal initial weight one. Clearly, for ® = 0
the limit distribution equals 1. Take ® 2 (0; 1] and consider the stochastic process
(N;P®(D)) with the stochastic matrix P®(D) = ®P(D) + (1 ¡ ®)I, where I denotes
the identity matrix. The transition matrix P®(D) has components given by p®ij = ®pij
if i 6= j, and p®i;j = ®pi;j + (1¡ ®) if i = j. Following the same reasoning as before, it
readily follows that closed irreducible sets in (N;P(D)) and (N;P®(D)) are the same.
The probabilities ½®T (j) that we ever arrive at a state in closed irreducible set T given
that we start at state j are given by
(i) ½®T (j) = 1 if j 2 T;
(ii) ½®T (j) = 0 if j 2 NRnT , and
(iii) for every j 2 NT it holds that ½®T (j) = §i2T p®ij +§i2NT p®ij :½®T (i) =
= §i2T®pij +§i2NT®pij:½
®
T (i) + (1¡ ®)½®T (j);
which yields that ®½®T (j) = §i2T®pij +§i2NT®pij:½
®
T (i), and thus
6In the context of arbitrary cooperative games, convex combinations of the egalitarian rule and
Shapley value are considered in Joosten (1996).
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½®T (j) = §i2T pij +§i2NT pij :½
®
T (i).
Comparing this to the corresponding equations (i), (ii), (iii) in section 3 (between Propo-
sitions 3.2 and 3.3) yields that ½®T (j) = ½T (j). Further, for closed irreducible set T it also
holds that P®(DjT )¼ = ¼ if and only if P(DjT )¼ = ¼, and thus stationary distribution
¼®T = ¼T . Hence, Theorem 3.5 is also valid for P®(D) such that all limit measures for
® 2 (0; 1] yield the same limit measure ¸.
Theorem 5.1. For every D 2 DN and ® 2 (0; 1] it holds that limt!1(P®(D))t1 equals
¸(D).
Appendix
The results of the matches played in the Carling Premier League 1997-1998 of Exam-
ple 4.1 are given in Table 2 (Arsenal (A), Aston Villa (AV), Barsnely (B), Blackburn
Rovers (BR), Bolton Wanderers (BW), Crystal Palace (CP), Chelsea (C), Coventry
City (CC), Derby County (DC), Everton (E), Leeds United (LU), Leicester City (LC),
Liverpool (L), Manchester United (MU), Newcastle United (NU), She¢eld Wednesday
(SW), Southampton (S), Tottenham Hotspur (TH), West Ham United (WHU), and
Wimbledon (W)). In the top half (above the empty diagonal) in every cel we …rst put
the number of goals scored by the row player and second the number of goals scored by
the column player in the match corresponding to that cel. In the bottom half (under
the diagonal) this is the other way around.
The corresponding transition matrix is obtained by letting !(i; j) be the number of
matches that team i won from team j (with !(i; i) = 2 for every i 2 N) and given in
Table 3.
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A AV B BR BW CP C CC DC E LU LC L MU NU SW S TH W H U W
A 0-0 5-0 1-3 4-1 1-0 2-0 2-0 1 -0 4-0 2-1 2 -1 0-1 3-2 3-1 1-0 3 -0 0-0 4-0 5-0
AV 1-0 0-1 0-4 1-3 3-1 0-2 3-0 2 -1 2-1 1-0 1 -1 2-1 0-2 0-1 2-2 1 -1 4-1 2-0 1-2
B 0-2 0-3 1-1 2-1 1-0 0-6 2-0 1 -0 2-2 2-3 0 -2 2-3 0-2 2-2 2-1 4 -3 1-1 1-2 2-1
BR 1-4 5-0 2-1 3-1 2-2 1-0 0-0 1 -0 3-2 3-4 5 -3 1-1 1-3 1-0 7-2 1 -0 0-3 3-0 0-0
BW 0-1 0-1 1-1 2-1 5-2 1-0 1-5 3 -3 0-0 2-3 2 -0 1-1 0-0 1-0 3-2 0 -0 1-1 1-1 1-0
CP 0-0 1-1 0-1 1-2 2-2 0-3 0-3 3 -1 1-3 0-2 0 -3 0-3 0-3 1-2 1-0 1 -1 1-3 3-3 0-3
C 2-3 0-1 2-0 0-1 2-0 6-2 3-1 4 -0 2-0 0-0 1 -0 4-1 0-1 1-0 1-0 4 -2 2-0 2-1 1-1
CC 2-2 1-2 1-0 2-0 2-2 1-1 3-2 1 -0 0-0 0-0 0 -2 1-1 3-2 2-2 1-0 1 -0 4-0 1-1 0-0
DC 3-0 0-1 1-0 3-1 4-0 0-0 0-1 3-1 3-1 0-5 0 -4 1-0 2-2 1-0 3-0 4 -0 2-1 2-0 1-1
E 2-2 1-4 4-2 1-0 3-2 1-2 3-1 1-1 1 -2 2-0 1 -1 2-0 0-2 0-0 1-3 0 -2 0-2 2-1 0-0
LU 1-1 1-1 2-1 4-0 2-0 0-2 3-1 3-3 4 -3 0-0 0 -1 0-2 1-0 4-1 1-2 0 -1 1-0 3-1 1-1
LC 3-3 1-0 1-0 1-1 0-0 1-1 2-0 1-1 1 -2 0-1 1-0 0-0 0-0 0-0 1-1 3 -3 3-0 2-1 0-1
L 4-0 3-0 0-1 0-0 2-1 2-1 4-2 1-0 4 -0 1-1 3-1 1 -2 1-3 1-0 2-1 2 -3 4-0 5-0 2-0
MU 0-1 1-0 7-0 4-0 1-1 2-0 2-2 3-0 2 -0 2-0 3-0 0 -1 1-1 1-1 6-1 1 -0 2-0 2-1 2-0
NU 0-1 1-0 2-1 1-1 2-1 1-2 3-1 0-0 0 -0 1-0 1-1 3 -3 1-2 0-1 2-1 2 -1 1-0 0-1 1-3
SW 2-0 1-3 2-1 0-0 5-0 1-3 1-4 0-0 2 -5 3-1 1-3 1 -0 3-3 2-0 2-1 1 -0 1-0 1-1 1-1
S 1-3 1-2 4-1 3-0 0-1 1-0 1-0 1-2 0 -2 2-1 0-2 2 -1 1-1 1-0 2-1 2-3 3-2 3-0 0-1
TH 1-1 3-2 3-0 0-0 1-0 0-1 1-6 1-1 1 -0 1-1 0-1 1 -1 3-3 0-2 2-0 3-2 1 -1 1-0 0-0
W H U 0-0 2-1 6-0 2-1 3-0 4-1 2-1 1-0 0 -0 2-2 3-0 4 -3 2-1 1-1 0-1 1-0 2 -4 2-1 3-1
W 0-1 2-1 4-1 0-1 0-0 0-1 0-2 1-2 0 -0 0-0 1-0 2 -1 1-1 2-5 0-0 1-1 1 -0 2-6 1-2
Table 2. Results of all matches played in Carling Premier League 1997-1998
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Table 3. Transition matrix of Carling Premier League 1997-1998
